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WHAT DOESN’T? 
 
Dan Hough* 
Abstract  A well-developed set of international anti-corruption tools now exists. These 
range from broad conventions to focused initiatives in specific policy areas. This article 
argues that international agreements work best when they are focused and they speak to 
the common interests of the parties involved. Solutions need to be creative, they need to 
bring in a broad coalition of stakeholders and they need to be focused on specific 
problems. International agreements need to help states with good quality institutions of 
governance focus on developing transparency initiatives, accountability drives and 
nuanced efforts to tackle particular national variants of “legal corruption.” In countries 
with patchy institutions of governance the scope for international influence is broader, 
while in states with serious governance challenges the best international anti-corruption 
efforts will often have surprisingly little to do with corruption at all. In a state where the 
rule of law is patchy or non-existent then anti-corruption laws (or indeed laws more 
generally) mean very little. The challenge here is to improve the basic tools of 
governance in the knowledge that only then can the issue of corruption be brought on to 
the agenda. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Given the amount of time and effort spent analyzing corruption in recent years it 
should come as no surprise that there are a wide variety of potential remedies on the 
market. Indeed, the world is most certainly not suffering from a dearth of toolkits, action 
plans, agreements, conventions, treaties and agendas for change. The aim of this article is 
not to unpack every anti-corruption option available, but rather to look at the evidence for 
what seems to work, what does not and how one could learn from both sets of outcomes. 
It focuses on international attempts to tackle corruption as well as initiatives that have an 
international resonance. To be blunt, the evidence that genuine progress has been made in 
tackling corruption is disappointingly thin on the ground. There is subsequently a case 
both for re-thinking what we think might work and also for assessing what indeed 
“success” might mean.  
I. ZERO-TOLERANCE, ZERO PROGRESS?  
For starters, any anti-corruption attempt that claims to want to eradicate corruption or 
indeed to adopt a “zero-tolerance approach” should be treated with more than a dose of 
scepticism. The aims are too grand and, quite frankly, incompatible with the rough and 
tumble of everyday life. Corruption will often be deeply embedded in given social and 
political practices and will be part of complex and ever-changing power relationships. 
That is as true in the UK as it is in China. That is all before any consensus has been 
reached as to what exactly the problem is and what needs to be done to put it right. The 
specific aims of anti-corruption efforts, in other words, need to be carefully defined.  
Reforms often take a long time to work, they need a modicum of good fortune along 
the way and can be “a lot more messy and acrimonious” than is generally anticipated.1 
One-size-fits-all policies, even of the most apparently obvious nature, can be 
counterproductive. Carefully designed strategies that are focused on local contexts and 
specific problems are very much the order of the day— even if they, too, fail from time to 
time as well. 
   That may sound rather pessimistic. But there are also grounds for optimism. Not 
optimism of the “corruption can be swept away” variety, but on the grounds that there are 
                                                        
1 Michael Johnston, Political Will or Political Won’t, 7(2) International Affairs Forum, 16 (2016). See 
also Michael Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), (2013). 
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ever more nuanced and potentially useful approaches developing. Both the international 
transparency and accountability agendas have developed traction in recent years, and one 
can go as far as saying in terms of transparency at least a norm is rapidly establishing 
itself. In order for this to have a genuine impact then there needs to be further work done 
in integrating national approaches around commonly agreed international standards. As 
noted below, there are reasons to believe that progress can be made in this area.  
II. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENDA  
Of all the mismatches in the world of anti-corruption the one between predominantly 
national efforts to tackle what is in essence an international problem is the most obvious. 
Assets that have been inappropriately acquired, for example, can be both quickly and 
easily laundered in apparently far-off jurisdictions. Criminals of all shapes and sizes have 
long since become adept at using global networks to avoid national law enforcement 
authorities. One of the clearest and most challenging tasks for those looking to combat 
corruption is subsequently to face down an inherently international set of problems with 
what still remain a wide and diverse set of predominantly national tools.  
A. The UNCAC 
The United Nations (UN) is the most obvious international institution that tries to face 
this problem down. The practical effects of the UN’s anti-corruption resolutions have 
traditionally remained relatively small, mainly as the UN does not tend to have the tools 
to enforce or even monitor its own anti-corruption clarion calls. The UN has nonetheless 
attempted to bring a more concerted and co-ordinated approach to its anti-corruption 
work via the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). As of Autumn 
2016, the convention had 140 full signatories whilst 194 entities were “parties” to it.1 
The UNCAC covers a considerable amount of ground, and there are provisions on law 
enforcement, preventative measures, international co-operation and technical assistance 
plus asset recovery. Parts of UNCAC are mandatory whilst other provisions remain 
suggestive.  
Since 2009, states’ progress in meeting the obligations that UNCAC places on them 
has been assessed via the Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM). The IRM is aimed 
at helping countries use a comprehensive self-assessment checklist to identify their 
progress and to pinpoint areas where they are experiencing problems.2 In theory, the 
process is co-operative and collaborative, and the country under review actively 
contributes to the final report that is being produced. The idea is that it is easier to make 
                                                        
1 For a full and updated list, available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2016).  
2 Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, Report of the 
Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption on Its Third Session, 
held in Doha from Nov. 9 to Nov. 13, 2009 (Vienna, UNODC), at 4. 
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progress if a constructive dialogue is taking place.  
The convention is certainly not lacking in ambition or indeed high-minded ideas, but 
in the cold light of day the impact of the treaty remains questionable. The “soft” nature of 
law in the international sphere means that implementation is always going to be more 
about persuasion than compulsion. One of the challenges that anti-corruption 
campaigners subsequently face is that of how to embed many of the principles in national 
law and also, most significantly, to make sure that national level actors do justice to them 
in practice. As Transparency International’s Marie Chêne notes “although legal measures, 
such as anti-corruption acts and agencies, have been established to execute UNCAC, 
there are local constraints to the full implementation of the Convention.” She specifically 
pinpoints “under-funding and lack of political will” as challenges.3 She could, however, 
have gone further. In 2013, Transparency International bluntly claimed that “the official 
process is not strong enough to keep countries on track” and that having analyzed 60 of 
the 69 completed reviews at that point the process “contains inherent weaknesses that 
undermine its effectiveness.”4 Or, as Chêne put it four years previously, progress has 
undoubtedly been made in sharpening up legal frameworks and aligning domestic 
legislation with UNCAC’s obligations, but “there are still major gaps to overcome for 
successful implementation.” Furthermore, many governments remain reluctant to publish 
their own self-assessments, let alone the full reports that are ultimately produced. In the 
cold light of day, it is clear that it is often very much easier to talk a good game than it is 
to play one.  
B. The OECD 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
developed a “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions” and it was adopted in November 1997. The 
convention is “the world’s most ambitious global agreement to combat business 
corruption” and requires signatories to enact domestic legislation criminalizing the 
bribery of foreign public officials and to impose strong sanctions on those who break the 
law.5  
The convention claims to establish “legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of 
foreign public officials in international business transactions” and there is an expectation 
                                                        
3  Marie Chêne, Update on UNCAC Implementation in Africa, U4 Expert Answer (Bergen: U4 
Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute), at 1 (2009). 
4 Transparency International, UNCAC Review Mechanism: Up and Running but Urgently Needing 
Improvement, (2013), available at http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/uncac_review_mechanism 
_up_and_running_but_urgently_needing_improvement (last visited Nov. 21, 2016)  
5 Terrence Chapman, Nathan Jensen & Edmund Malesky et al., International Bribery Laws and Firm 
Strategic Behavior: Did the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Increase Bribery?, IPES Working Papers 
(Princeton), (2016), available at https://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2016/papers/S230_rm1.pdf (last visited Nov. 
21, 2016). 
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that these standards will be translated into national legislation.6 Like UNCAC, the 
OECD’s convention makes use of peer-review as a tool for ensuring that signatories make 
good on their obligations. The monitoring reports subsequently contain recommendations 
that are “formed from rigorous examinations of each country.”7 
However, much as is the case with the UNCAC, the OECD has no authority to 
actively enforce the convention. The OECD has developed an intricate four-phase 
monitoring process to oversee enforcement, but if states do not move to actively 
implement their promises then the OECD is powerless to compel them. The only power it 
has is the power to persuade. Unsurprisingly, this has led to a mixed implementation 
record. In 2016, Transparency International noted that only four (Germany, Switzerland, 
the UK and the USA) countries were actively enforcing the treaty, whilst six (Austria, 
Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy and Norway) were “moderately” enforcing it. In just 
under half of the 20 signatory states there was only very little or no enforcement taking 
place at all. That group included Denmark, the state than came in 1st in the 2016 
Corruption Perceptions Index.8 
That mixed implementation record may, however, still be better than having no 
implementation record at all. As Jensen and Malesky have noted, bringing in a peer 
review phase made a clear difference to the bribery behavior of signatory countries’ firms 
active in Vietnam. They put that down to OECD signatory governments becoming more 
willing to police the behavior of “their” firms abroad.9 That is undoubtedly a positive 
development. 
However, there may well be a cloud accompanying that particular silver lining; there 
is also evidence of a series of unanticipated effects on the behavior of firms from states 
that do not participate in the convention. These firms are more likely to bribe than they 
were before the OECD brought in its system of peer review. Furthermore, firms from 
non-signatory states “will tend to increase their bribery effort” as less competition from 
firms across the 41 signatories “translates into a higher probability of accessing rents.” To 
compound that even further this increased rate of bribery “is exacerbated as the quality of 
monitoring and the severity of enforcement under the convention increases.” In other 
words, the more the OECD policies its own convention, the more bribery we see from the 
150 plus non-signatory states.10  
                                                        
6 OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, (Paris, OECD), (2016), available at http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention. 
htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).  
7 Id.  
8  Transparency International, Exporting Corruption, (2015), available at https://www.transparency. 
org/exporting_corruption/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2016)  
9  Nathan Jensen & Edmund Malesky, Does the OECD Convention Affect Bribery? Investment 
Liberalization and Corruption in Vietnam, Unpublished Manuscript (2016). 
10 See Chapman, Jensen & Malesky et al., fn. 5. 
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If the aim of the OECD’s convention is to reduce overall levels of bribery, then this is 
clearly a worrying finding and poses plenty of awkward questions. Further research is 
needed before those findings can be generalized more broadly. Vietnam is, after all, just 
one country. But the conclusions provide plenty of food for thought. One way forward 
will be to try and sign up more countries to the treaty’s aims. If those signatories are 
states with significant export sectors, then there is good reason to believe that the 
OECD’s treaty can make a real impact on international bribery transactions. If that proves 
elusive, then the treaty’s advocates may have a real problem. If nothing else, this is a 
perfect example of how the road to successfully fighting corruption is nothing if not 
winding. 
C. Regional Anti-Corruption Initiatives  
There are now a number of regional initiatives that look to set common 
anti-corruption standards. Indeed, most regional governance bodies now talk about 
corruption in some way, shape or form. Quite how they talk about it and what action 
those discussions lead to is, however, another matter. In Europe, for example, the Council 
of Europe (CoE) has developed both civil and criminal law conventions on corruption. In 
1999, it also set up the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) with the aim of 
monitoring compliance with both of these conventions as well as with the CoE’s other 
anti-corruption initiatives. More specifically, GRECO uses the now familiar tools of 
mutual evaluation and peer pressure to identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption 
policies. It also claims to provide a forum that enables member states to share best 
practice in preventing and detecting corruption.11 
1. The European Union.—The European Union (EU) also now has a number of quite 
clear anti-corruption provisions. Judicial co-operation between EU members states to 
prevent corruption by EU-level or indeed nation-state level officials has existed since 
1997, whilst, before they were abolished in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU passed a number of 
framework decisions—decisions that required member states to achieve a particular 
outcome without being told specifically how to do it—that looked to combat corruption. 
The EU has also set up its own anti-fraud body (OLAF) to try and prohibit fraud within 
the EU budget and across the EU’s institutions, as well as to develop broader anti-fraud 
legislation. With over 1,400 investigations and € 3 billion recovered between 2010–2015, 
OLAF clearly has also been busy.12 The EU has also been keen to stress the importance 
of anti-corruption in the accession process, and both Romania and Bulgaria had their 
applications for EU membership delayed on account of making too little progress in this 
area.  
                                                        
11 Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), (2014), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/3.%20What%20is%20GRECO_en.asp (last visited Nov. 
23, 2016). 
12 See http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud//home_en (last visited Nov. 23, 2016).  
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The impact of all this activity remains harder to discern. The EU has little power to 
compel member states to take action in this area, and where anti-corruption progress is 
made it is not always easy to see the EU’s hand at play. Liljana Cvetanoska has 
nonetheless illustrated that the accession process is one area where some progress can be 
made. Even then, substantive moves to enact anti-corruption legislation are much more 
likely to happen early on in the accession process when states theoretically have most 
ground to make up but only when it suits the needs of those in power. In Macedonia, for 
example, the pull of the EU was simply not as strong as the defence of systems that were 
working very nicely for those at the top of the pyramid.13 In situations like that, the EU’s 
power to persuade remains much weaker than it might like. 
2. Other Regional Initiatives.—It is not just the EU and European states that have 
been thinking about corruption. In Africa, the “African Union Convention on Preventing 
and Combatting Corruption” came in to force in 2003 and has 35 signatories. This 
convention covers a wide range of issues in both the public and the private sectors and all 
provisions are mandatory. Issues such as recovering stolen assets and improving regional 
co-operation figure prominently. The League of Arab States also has a “Convention on 
Corruption” that came in to force in 2010 where the restitution of assets and providing 
mutual judicial assistance are flagged as being particularly important. On the other side of 
the world, the countries in the Organization of American States ratified the 
“Inter-American Convention against Corruption” as long ago as 1996. The focus there is 
more on the public sector and it represents an effort to find a regional consensus on a 
range of corruption issues. Even in East Asia, traditionally something of an outlier, China 
has been working with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states to 
try and develop regional anti-corruption legal frameworks.14  
   These initiatives sound impressive on paper, but when the complex and challenging 
nature of tackling corruption is remembered, it would nonetheless be unreasonable to 
expect too much from them. There are, however, good reasons to wonder whether these 
regional bodies represent a coherent way forward. A number of regions do not have 
regional bodies at all and Matthew Stephenson has outlined why there may be good 
reasons for them not to bother creating them. UNCAC, Stephenson notes, claims to be the 
global instrument for tackling corruption. If international efforts are subsequently going 
to work, then UNCAC would appear to be the most appropriate vehicle for helping them 
to do so. Plus, the majority of the regional conventions existed before UNCAC came 
along— creating new ones now would seem a little odd.  
There is, as Stephenson argues, a case to be made that regional conventions can 
                                                        
13 Liljana Cvetanoska, The European Union’s Anti-Corruption Enlargement Conditionality: Comparing 
the Czech Republic, Romania and Macedonia, University of Sussex (Brighton) Ph.D. dissertation (2017). 
14 ZHANG Yan, China, ASEAN to Bring Corrupt Officials to Justice, China Daily, Nov. 3, 2016, 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-11/03/content_27260187.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 
2016). 
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conduct more frequent reviews and they can build on the basis that the UNCAC provides, 
but there is also a real danger of “convention overload” and “peer review fatigue.”15 The 
impression would become ever more prominent that more time was being spent talking 
about corruption than actually tackling it. On top of that, the idea that local neighbors 
work better together can often be a long way removed from reality. Furthermore, the 
temptation may also be there to “respect local values” and in effect nicely undercut 
UNCAC. As Stephenson persuasively notes, the “focus both within the region and 
outside should be on pressing for compliance with global norms” that everyone 
understands and can sign up to.16      
Over and beyond these conventions, there are a plethora of more focused initiatives 
that try to do something about particular parts of the corruption problem. These initiatives 
range from quite expansive attempts to tackle money laundering fostering more 
transparency in the extractive industries to the creation of much lower profile initiatives 
in specific sectors.  
III. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE  
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is a good example of an organization that is 
dealing with a complex, international problem such as money laundering and latterly 
terrorist financing, that is by definition exceptionally difficult to uncover let alone root 
out. FATF has developed a series of recommendations (49 as of 2016) and signatories are 
expected to enact them in to their domestic legal frameworks. FATF, again via peer 
review, assesses their success and failure in doing that. Currently, it has 37 full members 
and 8 associate members as well as many more countries that have generally endorsed the 
standards that FATF has developed and made a commitment to upholding them.  
Though FATF’s task is tough, there is reason to believe that it has made a difference. 
Sabina Kook from the US treasury, for example, noted in 2013 that FATF is almost 
“unique among the scores of global governance bodies” as it does actually appear to have 
been “largely successful in pushing countries forward to comply with its standards.” The 
process of reviewing promises to commit to FATF’s standards has been useful whilst the 
“strong multilateral action” that has ensued when states have not played ball has caught 
the eye.17 The strongest of these actions involves FATF effectively blacklisting any of 
the jurisdictions around the world that it deems uncooperative. Indeed, in 2000 it 
                                                        
15  Matthew Stephenson, A Regional Anticorruption Convention in the Asia-Pacific?, The Global 
Anticorruption Blog, (2014), available at https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2015/09/01/a-regional- 
anticorruption-convention-in-the-asia-pacific/#more-3988 (last visited Nov. 23, 2016).  
16 Id.  
17  Sabina Kook, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Evolving in Its Effort to Combat Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Finance, United States’ Treasury Notes, Mar. 27, 2013, available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/ 
connect/blog/Pages/Financial-Action-Task-Force-(FATF)-Evolving-in-its-Effort-to-Combat-Money-Launderi
ng-and-Terrorist-Financing.aspx (last visited Nov. 24, 2016).  
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published a list of 15 jurisdictions that it officially called “non-cooperative countries or 
territories.” By October 2013, that list included 13 jurisdictions, but by June 2014 the 
number had fallen to six (Iran, North Korea, Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia and Myanmar). 
By October 2016, only Iran and North Korea were left on the so-called blacklist.18 The 
impact of being blacklisted has arguably been more significant than have the 
recommendations that FATF has developed, and a number of countries have reacted 
quickly, and often grumpily to being described as non-cooperative.  
IV. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES’ TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE  
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has been quite successful. It 
is, however, rather more contested. Formed in June 2003, it has developed a global 
standard to promote and ensure openness and transparency in the gas, oil and mining 
industries— industries that have traditionally been plagued by corruption. The logic of the 
EITI is simple; information should be publicly shared on every part of the resource 
extraction process. That includes how much companies pay for licenses to do the 
extracting, how much of that resource they then produce, what they charge for it and who 
pays them for it. Governments, for their part, need to reveal their incomings from the 
extractives sector and to explain how that money is spent. Membership of EITI is not just 
limited to countries; companies and civil society initiatives are also welcome to join. In 
May 2005, EITI stakeholders worked together to establish six criteria outlining the 
minimum transparency requirements they felt should be required. By 2011, these rules 
had developed in to 23 specific criteria and in May 2013 these became the “EITI 
Standard.”  
51 countries have committed themselves to upholding that standard, and every one of 
them is required to publish an annual report disclosing all information on each part of the 
resource extraction process. In theory, the EITI sets a high barrier. Furthermore, it has 
been “an important and innovative actor” leading the way in “developing consultative 
processes” that have had a clear impact in terms of opening up discussions on 
transparency across the extractive industries and indeed beyond.19 In terms of oil and gas, 
there is a move towards an openness that simply did not exist just a decade ago. That 
should be counted as success of a sort. This move is necessarily piecemeal and at times 
cumbersome, but it is a move in the right direction. Plus, before EITI there was no global 
discussion at all about the behavior of those in the extractives sector; this really is a case 
that something is better than nothing.  
                                                        
18  FATF, Public Statement, 21 October 2016, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/ 
high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-october-2016.html (last visited Nov. 
24, 2016).   
19  Martin Brown, The EITI and the Challenge of Transparency, Sussex Centre for the Study of 
Corruption Blog, (2015), available at https://scscsussex.wordpress.com/2015/12/17/the-eiti-and-the- 
challenge-of-transparency/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2016).  
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It is nonetheless intriguing that some of the countries that are most prone to 
corruption in the area of extractives have still been keen to sign up to EITI. At first sight, 
that would appear to be a paradox; why commit yourself to more transparency when that 
very commitment is likely to prevent many government insiders from reaping the rewards 
of the deals that they have struck? Elizabeth David-Barrett and Ken Okamura offer an 
explanation for this. They argue that “EITI serves as a reputational intermediary” for an 
array of stakeholders. Governments intent on reforming at least some of their ways “can 
signal good intentions” whilst actors in the international arena “can reward achievement” 
in the cases of those who make substantive progress. Transparency becomes a norm that 
ever more governments (at least appear to) want to subscribe to. A small but noticeable 
virtuous circle is therefore created.20 
There have nonetheless been a string of criticisms made of EITI. In the cold light of 
day, the EITI does not possess many teeth. The options for sanctioning miscreants are 
only weak at best. Exxon Mobil, for example, is a member of the EITI US 
Multi-Stakeholder Group, but it still refuses to share information on the taxes that it pays 
in the USA.21 There are also questions about what precisely EITI should demand of 
signatories; should the barrier be high in the knowledge that some countries and 
companies will fail or should it be lower with a view to slowly coaxing and cajoling 
everyone forward? EITI participants have had plenty of internal arguments about 
precisely this.  
V. THE SHIPPING AND MARITIME INITIATIVE 
One initiative that has nonetheless made a clear impact on its industry is the 
“Shipping and Maritime Initiative” at TRACE International. Its focus is on how to tackle 
bribery and corruption more broadly at ports. It has a narrower focus than the EITI and 
that may be one of the reasons that it appears to have been more successful. The initiative 
was developed “in response to the direct request of vessel owners, shipping agents and 
freight forwarders” and aims to develop focused solutions that help to rise to the not 
insignificant compliance challengers in this sector.22 The activities that are included in 
this initiative are quite wide-ranging; knowledge-sharing and benchmarking take place 
through an anti-bribery customs working group, for example, whilst due diligence 
                                                        
20 Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett & Ken Okamura, Norm Diffusion and Reputation: The Rise of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, 29(2) Governance, 227 (2016). 
21 Patrick Rucker, Exxon Blocking U.S. Progress on Energy Transparency: Watchdog Chief, Business 
Insider, Dec. 7, 2015, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/r-exxon-blocking-us-progress- on-energy- 
transparency-watchdog-chief-2015-12 (last visited Nov. 25, 2016). See also Martin Brown, The EITI and the 
Challenge of Transparency, Sussex Centre for the Study of Corruption Blog, (2015), available at 
https://scscsussex.wordpress.com/2015/12/17/the-eiti-and-the-challenge-of-transparency/ (last visited Nov. 
25, 2016). 
22 For more see Shipping and Maritime Initiative, available at http://www.traceinternational.org/shipping/ 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2016). 
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reviews take place of third party companies active in the sector and the results of which 
are provided to shipping and ports’ agents. TRACE International’s efforts certainly will 
not eradicate corruption in the maritime industry, but the initiative nonetheless fits the 
mould of the type of collective action thinking that long-time advocates of such ideas 
such as Mark Pieth have championed; stakeholders working together on discrete 
challenges to come up with mutually agreeable solutions.23    
VI. THE TRANSPARENCY CHALLENGE  
The challenge of putting transparency at the heart of governance is now a 
fundamental part of many of these reform initiatives. Indeed, the vast majority of 
governments laud the value of transparency in abstract terms, even if they are often much 
more reluctant to do justice to it in the real world of bureaucratic politics. As the case 
studies above illustrate, initiatives in this area come in a number of different guises; there 
are broad commitments to general goals and there are specific schemes that look to try 
and persuade governments and firms to sign up and implement a given agenda.  
These case studies exist within a context of more and more governments claiming that 
they want to both bring about more open government and encourage the public release of 
all data related to governments’ affairs (“open data”). Both of these initiatives have 
received plenty of attention in previous years, although it is not always clear precisely 
how they should work in practice.24 Transparency, of course, has long been regarded as 
an effective anti-corruption tool, but it was only with the launch of the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP) by 8 governments in 2011 that it became institutionalized. 
Improvements in the quality of data available as well as the technology to process and 
analyze it, plus the development of increasingly vocal international pro-transparency 
movement led, by Autumn 2016, 70 governments to sign the OGP and to make over 
2,500 commitments.25 Governments commit themselves to develop action plans with 
specific commitments to enable citizens to find out more about what they are doing.  
This objective is, however, a deceptively simple one, and quite how governments do 
this in practice varies a lot from state to state. This, in other words, is an international 
initiative that is translated very differently from place to place. The broad goals may be 
regarded as universal, but the implementation is decidedly national. One of the challenges 
is that there is an implicit assumption that the process of developing an open data and 
indeed an open government agenda is a value-neutral one. In practice there are disputes 
about precisely what data should be released, how it should be released and how we 
                                                        
23 Mark Pieth ed., Collective Action: Innovative Strategies to Prevent Corruption, Dike Verlag (St 
Gallen), (2012).  
24
 Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett, Paul M. Heywood & Nikolaos Theodorakis, Open Data as an Anti-Corruption 
Tool: Theory and UK Practice, forthcoming in Public Administration Review, (2017). 
25 Open Government Partnership, What Is the Open Government Partnership?, available at http://www. 
opengovpartnership.org/about (last visited Nov. 25, 2016).  
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should be able to access it. The language used to defend and indeed implement open data 
agendas is often thoroughly technocratic, but, as David-Barrett et al. note, that 
“overlook[s] the highly political context in which rules for open data are set and 
implemented.”26 
This has led to a series of challenges—teething problems, optimists would no doubt 
say—in terms of making open data really come to life. The data is not always published 
in a format that is easily useable. What it certainly needs to be is both machine-readable 
and in line with an agreed set of international standards. Offering up reams of .pdfs might 
enable someone to tick a box on a checklist, but it does nothing in terms of helping 
interested observers understand what is really going on. There also need to be clear 
procedures in place for reporting problems and issues that come up in the data; as things 
stand, that is not the case even in the states that lead the way in terms of the transparency 
agenda.27 
Some states have made impressive progress in developing tools that enable their 
citizens to find out more about how those in power spend their time and citizens’ money 
and indeed earn money through other sources. In the UK, for example, websites such as 
www.theyworkforyou.com (TWFY) enable citizens from the UK and beyond, not just to 
see precisely what their parliamentarians say and do in parliament, but also where they 
travelled to for work purposes and the payments over and beyond their salary that they 
receive for public appearances, speeches and other paid work.  
Just a few seconds worth of clicking on TWFY and you will be able to uncover, for 
example, that on 16 January 2016, Diane Abbot (Labour Party), then the UK’s Shadow 
Home Secretary, registered a £ 700 appearance fee for co-presenting the BBC’s “This 
Week” TV show.28 David Davis, then the (Conservative Party) Secretary of State for 
Exiting the EU, revealed on 1 July 2016 that he received approximately £ 34,000 per 
annum for the six days of work a year he does for Mansfeider Kupfer und Messing 
GMBH, a German manufacturing company based in Hettstedt.29  
VII. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE TRACKING SURVEYS 
Calls for greater transparency come nonetheless in lots of different shapes and sizes. 
One of the approaches that has real potential involves rolling out what have come to be 
known as public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS). PETS help highlight cases where 
                                                        
26 See Dávid-Barrett, Heywood & Theodorakis, fn. 25. 
27 For more on this in the UK in particular, see Dávid-Barrett, Heywood & Theodorakis, fn. 24.  
28 TheyWorkForYou, Register of Members’ Interests; Diane Abbot MP, (2016), available at 
https://www.theyworkforyou.com/mp/10001/diane_abbott/hackney_north_and_stoke_newington#register 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2016)  
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 TheyWorkForYou, Register of Members’ Interests; David Davis MP, (2016), available at 
https://www.theyworkforyou.com/mp/10162/david_davis/haltemprice_and_howden#register (last visited  
Nov. 25, 2016).  
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public money has either not ended up where it should have or cannot actually be 
accounted for at all. That money could, of course, have been misallocated or lost on 
account of incompetence, but when systematic patterns of misallocation are revealed, we 
have a pattern of behavior to hand that may well have corrupt practices at its core. PETS 
have subsequently become “effective in identifying delays in financial and in-kind 
transfers, leakage rates, and general inefficiencies in public spending.”30 Indeed, it is 
those “leakage rates” that catch the eye not just of corruption analysts but also of the 
public at large. It is not difficult to see the reason why; unaccounted for money is rarely 
dumped in a lake or burnt on a bonfire. It ends up somewhere, and frequently that 
somewhere is an illegitimate home.  
Exploring patterns of leakage across space is therefore an attractive way of illustrating 
where problems may indeed lie and an increasingly rich research agenda has developed in 
this area. Jonathan Stromseth, Edmund Malesky and Dimitar Gueorguiev, for example, 
use this approach in trying to assess how much corruption may or may not be taking place 
across China’s 33 provinces. They used data from the China National Auditing Office to 
put together a data set illustrating how much money was misused as a proportion of each 
state’s provincial budget. They wanted to know, in other words, how much money each 
Chinese province was unable to account for and they used that figure as a proxy for what 
they term “macro-corruption.” 31  Some leakage will happen everywhere and it is 
important to note that not all leakage comes about because of corruption. Sometimes 
things really do just get lost. However, in 2011 nearly 20 percent of the budget of 
Heilongjiang Province was misused—it is highly unlikely that that is all down to 
mistakes and errors.32  
PETS can also be effective at a much lower level. Indeed, that is in many ways the 
place where PETS show the greatest potential to impact both policy and service delivery. 
Being aware of the amount of money allocated to a primary school by a local authority, 
for example, might not tell you anything about how much corruption is taking place. 
Looking at the expenditures of the primary school in question, however, may help unpack 
whether the money that has been allocated has indeed been spent and what it was in fact 
spent on. Doing this across a representative sample of primary schools in a district will 
help create a bottom up set of indicators illustrating where money is going and why, and 
whether there appear to be any anomalies in the process of getting it there.33 
                                                        
30 Margaret Koziol & Courtney Tolmie, Using Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys to Monitor Projects 
and Small-Scale Programs: A Guidebook, World Bank Publications (Washington D.C.), at 1 (2010). 
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33 For a good example of this in Brazil see Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan & Diana B. Moreira (2012), 
Corrupting Learning: Evidence from Missing Federal Education Funds in Brazil, 96 Journal of Public 
Economics, (2012).  
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In 1996, Uganda became the first country where a PETS was formally carried out. 
The approach was embraced on account of substantial increases in expenditure on 
education not trickling down to the education providers. Or, indeed, they may have been 
trickling down, but there was a widespread belief that they were then being deliberately 
misallocated and misspent. The PETS approach was used to “compare budget allocations 
to actual spending through various tiers of government.” This included “frontline service 
delivery points,” all with the aim of working out where money was actually going.34 The 
results were chastening. In 1996, only 13 percent of the government expenditure per 
student actually reached the school that it was theoretically destined for. 87 percent, in 
other words, either vanished or was captured by local officials for private gain. Making 
sense of a large and off-the-books bargaining game between schools and local officials 
was key to understanding who ultimately ended up with what. On seeing these results, the 
central Ugandan government immediately recognized the problem and took action. 
Details of how much money was transferred to the local authorities began to be published 
in newspapers and via other media outlets whilst primary schools were required to make 
public what they spent the money allocated to them on. With more information available, 
it became harder for the corrupt bargains that characterized relationships in the 
mid-1990’s to hold. The government, in other words, signalled that it was going to 
oversee, and indeed measure, the way that funds were spent.35 
CONCLUSION 
The international community is making progress in terms of tackling corruption. But 
that progress is slow, piecemeal and often involves backward steps as well as forward 
ones. The push towards more robust implementation of FATF’s guidelines, for example, 
is encouraging. However, an awful lot of countries are wary of embracing the spirit as 
well as the letter of the agreements that they have signed up to. Plenty of states would be 
much happier if registers of beneficial owners (for example) were not available to the 
public at large, and many anti-corruption campaigners were disappointed when in 2016 
even David Cameron—a champion of beneficial ownership as a concept—made it clear 
that the UK’s overseas territories were going to be exempt from the UK’s otherwise 
impressive new legislation in this area.36 
The UNCAC remains the most lauded international initiative, but its effect has been 
                                                        
34 See Koziol & Tolmie, fn. 30 at 3. See also Emmanuel Ablo & Ritva Reinikka, Do Budgets Really 
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2017]   INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO TACKLING CORRUPTIO   353 
patchy at best. States may pass legislation that meets with UNCAC requirements, but 
UNCAC has little power to compel signatories to actively enforce these rules. The same 
applies to the OECD’s anti-bribery treaty, with little more than a handful of states 
actively enforcing its provisions. International law is inevitably “softer” than national 
law, but the outputs from these initiatives are still disappointing.  
If one were to ask business leaders about international attempts to regulate corrupt 
practice, then the chances are that it would talk more about national pieces of legislation 
than about international law. Despite being largely dormant for a quarter of a century, the 
United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has now become something that 
firms from all countries that operate in the global economy have to be aware of. The fact 
that the FCPA can now be seen to apply to companies that only have a minimal presence 
in the USA is for many evidence that the FCPA is overstretching. For others, it is simply 
a clear, powerful statement against a deep-rooted norm that traditionally saw foreign 
bribery as part of the game. Throw in an even more powerful UK Bribery Act (UKBA) 
and it is clear that national anti-corruption regimes are making an impact on how firms 
think about bribery as a business tool. Quite how these thoughts are evolving remains a 
moot point; the UKBA in particular is still new and the convictions have been few in 
number and often small in scope, but these laws send a clear statement that things in the 
bribery world are changing. There is also evidence that states where firms have been 
prosecuted under the FCPA are more likely to beef up and indeed enforce their own 
domestic bribery laws. Again, this is certainly progress. 
Governments intent on tackling corruption nonetheless face a real challenge in 
demonstrating that their efforts are having an impact. High profile attempts to imprison 
big names might look good, but they can often have the feel of tokenism. Changing the 
norms of behavior is a long-term game and, indeed, it is not one that national 
governments can realistically play. They have neither the time nor the tools to take on 
such challenges. In this regard it is an impressive government that embraces agendas for 
reform over the medium, let alone the long-term. Successful reform requires the 
identification of specific goals and it requires a clear explanation of how these reforms 
are going to be achieved. Any government that claims it will be adopting a zero-tolerance 
approach or indeed that it will sweep away corruption should be treated with some 
caution. In a world of ever more populist rhetoric, it is much better to under-promise and 
over-deliver rather than the other way around. 
The best reforms are subsequently those that bring a broad range of actors together to 
pursue sets of agreed aims. Sometimes this involves talking to power-holders or 
power-brokers who have interests that need to be respected. This may involve talking to 
people who ideally would be avoided. But in many states there is no way around the fact 
that those in power could potentially have much to lose if genuine reform is enacted. 
Expecting them to give up what they have and even agree to things where they or their 
allies could end up coming into conflict with the law is simply unrealistic. Turkeys do not 
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vote for Christmas, after all. The real challenge is working out what progress is possible 
where. Policies that help citizens find out just a little more about how decisions are made, 
about how they can legitimately defend their own interests and that hold those in power 
responsible for their actions are likely to be steps forward. But, do not expect them to be 
simple steps or ones that with something to lose will take lying down. The road to reform 
is incremental, confusing and often involves spending considerable time lost down 
cul-de-sacs. 
Anti-corruption is also not an island in a sea. It makes little sense to create institutions 
that do not talk and indeed work with each other and with broader society at large. 
Successful anti-corruption needs an educational element, just as it also needs an 
institutional and a social element. Only when all these things interact and work together is 
serious progress likely to be made. 
